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ANOTHER MOVE AWAY FROM TITLE VII: WHY
GROSS GOT IT RIGHT
Jacqueline Go*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent recession that began in 2008 is hindering job
growth, and unemployment is hovering around 9 percent.'
Because older and higher-ranking employees typically receive
higher salaries and expensive medical and pension perks,2 it
is not uncommon for companies to trim costs and maximize
cost savings by letting these employees go during a
recession.' As a result, higher numbers of older workers are
hunting for jobs, but are faced with more hurdles to
employment and endure considerably longer periods of
unemployment than their younger counterparts.4 Although
recruiters maintain that experience is still valued, older
workers face significant age-bias stereotypes, which label
them as overqualified and overpriced, as well as lower
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1. Employment Situation Summary, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR; BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nrO.htm (last visited
Feb. 9, 2011).
2. See Associated Press, Laid-off Older Workers Face Biases in Job Search,
MSNBC.COM (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33298536/ns/busines
s-careers; see also Susan Donaldson James, Unemployment: Companies Cut
Pricey Older Workers, ABCNEWS (Mar. 10, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Busine
ss/story?id=7042634&page=1.
3. James, supra note 2.
4. Liz Wolgemuth, When Age Bias Hinders the Job Hunt, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/money/careers/articles
/2009/09/30/when-age-bias-hinders-the-job-hunt.html.
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performers than younger candidates, and less motivated and
energized.5
The combination of job losses and trouble finding new
employment has contributed to the highest number of age
discrimination complaints being filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in two
decades.6 Specifically, age discrimination charges filed with
the EEOC jumped 33 percent during the past two fiscal years
and are expected to increase as unemployment rates continue
to rise.' As more unemployed, older workers face sinking
home values, evaporating retirement savings, and bleak job
prospects, ageism emerges as a noticeable but unpunished
employer trend.8 Because the number of older-worker layoffs
is expected to rise, older workers will continue to turn to
federal employment law for protection against any form of
discrimination, especially when financial security is grim, as
it is now.'
Protection against age discrimination in the workplace is
conferred by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA").'o The ADEA is similar to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), which prohibits workplace
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Because both statutes use nearly identical language,
some courts deciding ADEA cases apply precedents developed
5. Id. (noting that these negative stereotypes are often untrue because
research has shown older workers commonly stay with a company longer than
younger workers); Associated Press, supra note 2 (citing an American
Association of Retired Persons ("AARP") study that showed older workers
received fewer interviews, and that those older workers who did receive an
interview, flaunted the younger qualities in their resumes).
6. Vickie Elmer, Age Discrimination Claims by Workers Reach Record
High, AARP BULLETIN (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.aarp.org/work/employee-
rights/info-03-
2009/age discriminationsclaims-byworkersreachrecordhigh.html.
7. Id. (stating that claims are rising because laid-off workers feel unfairly
targeted, and more inexperienced managers are conducting lay-offs without
sufficient safeguards before issuing pink slips like statistical tests); see also
Allison Linn, Age Bias Complaints Surge in Weak Economy, NBC SAN DIEGO
(June 29, 2010), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/business/Age-bias complain
tssurge-in weakeconomy-97378139.html.
8. See Wolgemuth, supra note 4 (noting the difficulties in studying age
discrimination because stereotypes are often concealed).
9. This could potentially lead to more age-discrimination complaints being
filed with the EEOC. See Elmer, supra note 6.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
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in Title VII cases,12 thus leading to inconsistent results.13 A
quagmire of standards of proof was used across the circuits,
and this ultimately led to the Supreme Court's decision in
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.14
First, this comment will examine the parallels and key
differences between the ADEA and Title VII.15  Second, this
comment will analyze the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the
influential Supreme Court cases that have shaped courts'
interpretations of the ADEA and Title VII.16  Third, this
comment will explore how Gross significantly altered the
standard of proof applicable to plaintiffs under the ADEA,
and why the standard set forth by the Supreme Court is
appropriate-namely because it coincides with congressional
intent, applies the appropriate burden-shifting framework,
and effectively corresponds to practical employer
compliance." Finally, this comment recommends that future
legislation akin to the recently proposed Protecting Older
Workers Against Discrimination Act18 should adopt the "but
for" standard of causation in order to provide damages for
plaintiffs and to further differentiate between the ADEA and
Title VII.'9
12. See Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 380, 382 n.12 (1976) [hereinafter Harvard Note] (citing to ADEA case
law that applies burden of proof standards developed in Title VII cases).
13. See, e.g., id. at 382 n.13 (citing Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499
F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974)).
14. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2009).
15. See infra Parts II.A.1-2.
16. See infra Parts II.A.3-II.B.
17. See infra Parts II.C-IV.
18. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 1756, 111th
Cong. (2009). The bill never became law. H.R. 3721 [111th]: Protecting Older
Workers Against Discrimination Act, GovTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/con
gress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-3721 (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). The last major
action with respect to the bill was the hearing by the Subcommittee on
Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions on May 5, 2010. H.R. REP. No.
111-696, at 42-43 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
111hrpt696/pdflCRPT-11lhrpt696.pdf.
19. See infra Part V.
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II. THE ADEA AND TITLE VII
A. Overview of Title VII and the ADEA
Title VII and the ADEA use nearly identical language.2 0
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to "discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."21 Age was not originally included in Title VII.22 But
in 1964, sensing age discrimination occurring in the
workplace, Congress asked the Secretary of Labor, W. Willard
Wirtz, to investigate age discrimination in the workplace."
After finding that age discrimination was a common
practice,2 4 Congress passed the ADEA to prohibit employers
from "discriminatling) against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such an individual's age. "25 Despite
the two statutes' similarities, their individual legislative
histories and congressional purposes, and subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, reveal important differences.
1. Legislative Histories and Purposes
Originally, age was not afforded protected status under
Title VII because Congress did not have enough evidence of
20. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . .. because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."), with 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a) (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or'refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual . .. because of such individual's age.").
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
22. See id.
23. Debra Burke, ADEA Disparate Impact Discrimination: A Pyrrhic
Victory?, 9 U.C. DAvIs Bus. L.J. 47, 48 (2008) (explaining that the investigation
uncovered employee age discrimination because of inaccurate stereotypes with
respect to older workers' abilities); see also Recent Cases, ADEA-Reverse
Discrimination Suits-Sixth Circuit Permits Reverse Age Discrimination Suit to
Proceed-Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir.
2002), 116 HARv. L. REV. 1533, 1533 (2003).
24. See Burke, supra note 23, at 48 ("Congress passed the [ADEA] in an
effort to eradicate arbitrary discrimination and negative stereotypes about the
performance level of older workers.").
25. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
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age discrimination in the workplace." In 1964, Secretary of
Labor W. Willard Wirtz investigated age discrimination and
uncovered that it varied significantly from other forms of
discrimination." Namely, he discovered that age
discrimination is usually based upon mistaken, preconceived
notions of ability rather than on feelings of hostility and
dislike of members of a certain group. 28 This distinction was
important enough that the Secretary of Labor advised against
extending race and gender antidiscrimination laws to age
discrimination.29
The ADEA's remedial and procedural provisions
originated from the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")."
The ADEA is "something of a hybrid, reflecting, on the one
hand, Congress's desire to use an existing statutory scheme
[(Title VII)] and a bureaucracy with which employers and
employees would be familiar [(the FLSA)] and, on the other
hand, its dissatisfaction with some elements of each of the
preexisting schemes."31
Just as the legislative histories and origins of Title VII
differ from the ADEA, so do the underlying purposes of the
two statutes. Congress initially passed Title VII to combat
race discrimination against African-Americans in the
workplace. 32  Title VII condemns all discrimination based
26. Adam N. Bitter, Smith v. City of Jackson: Solving an Age-Old Problem?,
56 CATH. U. L. REV. 647, 651-52 (2007).
27. See id. at 652 ("[In contrast to other forms of discrimination, employers
did not demonstrate animus or intolerance of older workers."); see also supra
note 5 and accompanying text.
28. Katherine Krupa Green, A Reason to Discriminate: Curtailing the Use of
Title VII Analysis in Claims Arising Under the ADEA, 65 LA. L. REV. 411, 415
(2004).
29. Id.; see also Harvard Note, supra note 12, at 383-84 (distinguishing race
discrimination because race has no correlation to ability to perform well at a job
but age is inherently related to ability at some point).
30. Leigh A. Van Ostrand, A Close Look at ADEA Mixed-Motives Claims
and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 405 (2009)
(explaining that, like the FLSA, the ADEA may be enforced either by the
Secretary of Labor or by the victim and that the remedies available are similar
to those available under the FLSA); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) ("The provisions
of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and
procedures provided in sections 211(b) . . . and 217 of this title, and subsection
(c).").
31. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578 (1978). "[Tjhe prohibitions of the
ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Id. at 584.
32. Green, supra note 28, at 414 ("Title VII served as the nation's first
legislation requiring employers to make employment decisions about
1029
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upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The ADEA
is narrower in scope and was enacted "to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment."3 4 The ADEA aims to prevent "arbitrary use of
age as a proxy for lack of ability."3 5  Although the ADEA
derives its substantive language from Title VII and shares
the purpose of eliminating workplace discrimination, the
statutes have considerable differences that become apparent
in an analysis of the ADEA's substantive statutory
provisions.
2. Exceptions to the ADEA
Some of the considerable differences between the ADEA
and Title VII derive from the exceptions codified in the
ADEA. 37 The ADEA contains two exceptions unavailable in
Title VII claims.3 8  First, an employer is not liable for
discriminatory employment practices under the ADEA where,
"age is a bona fide occupational qualification [("BFOQ")]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business."3  Second, the employer is not acting
unlawfully if the "differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age [("RFOA")]."4O By codifying these
exceptions, Congress recognized that age can be a legitimate
individuals strictly based upon their ability, as opposed to protected
characteristics such as race or gender.").
33. Nancy L. Lane, After Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of 1991:
Providing Attorney's Fees to Plaintiffs in Mixed Motive Age Discrimination
Cases, 3 ELDER L.J. 341, 344-46 (1995) (explaining that certain substantive
provisions of the statute indicate that Congress did not intend for the ADEA to
punish all age discrimination).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006).
35. Lane, supra note 33, at 346 (emphasis added). "[The ADEA] has both a
remedial goal to compensate age discrimination victims and a broad social
policy goal to eliminate arbitrary age discrimination in society." Id. at 344-45.
36. See Green, supra note 28, at 418 (indicating that courts have relied upon
Title VII analysis for ADEA claims because of these similarities).
37. See Ostrand, supra note 30, at 406.
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
39. Id. The statute also provides employer defenses if the differentiation is
part of a bona fide seniority system or observes the terms of a bona fide
employee benefit plan. § 623(f)(2).
40. § 623(f)(1).
[Vol:511030
2011] ANOTHER MOVE AWAY FROM TITLE VII
consideration by employers in certain instances, while also
underlining its concern for arbitrary differentiation of older
workers.41
3. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
In 1991, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and broadened the scope of Title VII.42 The amendment (the
"1991 Act") codified the ban on disparate impact
discrimination "when a facially neutral employment practice
adversely impacts one group more harshly than another and
cannot be justified by a business need."43 The 1991 Act also
transformed Title VII in two other respects. First, the
amendment made it unlawful for race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin to be a motivating factor for any decision
regarding an employment practice, even if the employer
considered other factors.4 4 Second, Congress made it
unlawful for employers to consider a protected trait in its
decision making process whereby the allegedly discriminatory
treatment is prohibited even if the employer can demonstrate
that it would have made the same employment decision
regardless of the illegitimate factor.4 5 Congress passed the
amendment to punish discriminatory behavior, even if the
employer would have made the same decision, to achieve the
statute's purpose of prohibiting "'invidious consideration' of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin."46
However, Congress remained silent as to whether the
1991 Act applied to the ADEA, leaving the courts to interpret
its meaning.4 7 Some courts concluded that Congress's silence
signified its intent to only limit Title VII because Congress
could have easily extended it to other types of
41. See Lane, supra note 33, at 346 ("It is equally clear that Congress did
not intend the ADEA to provide a general remedy for unemployment among
older workers.").
42. See Matthew Brod, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.: Determining
the Evidentiary Requirements for Bringing a Non-Title VII Mixed-Motive Case, 4
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 349, 355 (2009) (explaining that
Congress provided additional remedies for intentional acts of workplace
discrimination).
43. See Green, supra note 28, at 421 (distinguishing disparate impact from
disparate treatment by not requiring a plaintiff to prove discriminatory motive).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) (emphasis added).
45. See § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
46. See Ostrand, supra note 30, at 415.
47. Bitter, supra note 26, at 674-75.
1031
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
discrimination.' Conversely, other courts applied the 1991
Act to claims brought under the ADEA because of the
"consistency presumption," that exists where interpretation of
one statute is binding on another statute when similar or
identical language is found in both."
Given the existence of these differing judicial
interpretations, an overview of Supreme Court decisions is
necessary to evaluate both how the ADEA has evolved in the
courts, and what questions remain regarding the applicability
of Title VII standards of proof to ADEA claims.
B. Pre-Gross Supreme Court Precedent
In 1973, the Supreme Court set out a burden-shifting
framework for Title VII claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green." Under this analysis, a plaintiff carries the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.5' To
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show:
(i) he is a member of a protected class; (ii) he is competent
to perform the job or is performing his duties
satisfactorily; (iii) he suffered an adverse employment
decision or action; and (iv) the decision or action occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination based on his membership in the protected
class.52
After the plaintiff establishes his or her prima facie case,
the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reason for the adverse
employment decision." If the defendant employer can
48. See Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in
Disparate Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas's Longevity and the Mixed-
Motives Mess, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 545 (2008) (citing Glanzman v. Metro
Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 512 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004)).
49. Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 217, 234-35 (2007); see also Green, supra note 28, at 418-19
(noting that courts used Title VII as the standard for ADEA claims because of
similar statutory construction and purpose); Bitter, supra note 26, at 657
(observing that courts used Lorillard's reasoning to support similar Title VII
disparate impact standards in ADEA claims).
50. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
51. Id.; see also Green, supra note 28, at 420 ("The significance of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is that it 'creates a legally mandatory,
rebuttable presumption of unlawful motive. If the defendant remains silent ...
the plaintiff wins.'").
52. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005).
53. Id.
[Vol:511032
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articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the
plaintiff is afforded the opportunity to prove the defendant's
allegedly nondiscriminatory reason is actually pretext.51 It is
this Title VII framework that some courts have applied to
ADEA claims, based upon the similarity of Title VII and the
ADEA's statutory language.55
1. Mixed-Motive Analysis and Price Waterhouse
In a disparate treatment claim," it is not uncommon for
a fact-finder to determine that the employer had both
legitimate and illegitimate reasons for its adverse
employment decision.51 These cases are referred to as
"mixed-motive" cases.58
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court set
forth the necessary burden-shifting framework in Title VII
"mixed-motive" claims. 9 The plurality opinion rejected an
interpretation of Title VII's "because of" language to mean
"but for" causation.60  The opinion articulated that in a
"mixed motive" case, if a plaintiff can show the discriminatory
motive was a "motivating factor" in the employment decision,
the burden shifts to defendant to prove that the same decision
would have been made regardless of the discriminatory
reason.6 ' Thus, an employer will "avoid a finding of liability
54. Id. (stating that the plaintiff must prove the defendant's pretext by a
preponderance of the evidence).
55. This ADEA interpretation and Title VII framework application is an
example of judicial use of the "consistency presumption." See supra note 49 and
accompanying text. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.
308, 311 (1996) ("We have never had occasion to decide whether that application
of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not
contest that point, we shall assume it.").
56. "Disparate treatment" discrimination refers to discrimination in cases
where the employer had a discriminatory motive or intent for its adverse
employment decision. Ann Marie Tracey, Still Crazy After All These Years?
The ADEA, the Roberts Court, and Reclaiming Age Discrimination as
Differential Treatment, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 607, 613 (2009).
57. Green, supra note 28, at 420 ("More often than not, mixed-motive cases
only arise when a plaintiff provides direct evidence of the employer's
discriminatory behavior; therefore, the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
analysis is inapplicable.").
58. Id.
59. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
60. Id. at 240 ("To construe the words 'because of as a colloquial shorthand
for 'but-for causation'. . . is to misunderstand them.").
61. Id. at 244-45 (explaining that Title VII attempts to balance employees'
rights and employers' freedom of choice). Courts later using the same
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
only by proving that it would have made the same decision
even if it had not allowed [the protected trait] to play such a
role."62
Yet, in most subsequent cases, courts have applied the
Title VII "mixed-motive" framework set out in Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion instead." Justice O'Connor's
concurrence has been more widely adopted because her vote
was needed for [the requisite five votes], and her opinion
contained a narrower rationale.6 4 Justice O'Connor agreed
with the plurality that the burden of persuasion should shift
to the employer after the plaintiff has put forth a prima facie
case.65  However, she departed from the plurality's
interpretation of Title VII's "because of' language, and
concluded that "if a decisional process is 'tainted' by
awareness of sex or race in any way, the employer has
violated the statute, and Title VII thus commands that the
burden shift to the employer to justify its decision."" If the
employer can justify its decision, then Justice O'Connor
proposed that the plaintiff should be required to show "direct
evidence" that the impermissible criterion was a "substantial
factor" in the employer's decision.6 ' The Supreme Court has,
thus far, declined to decide whether Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion is binding precedent."
Two years after Price Waterhouse, Congress amended
Title VII, with the 1991 Act, and expanded protections for
ADEA plaintiffs.69  Although Congress codified Price
framework have termed the analysis "mixed-motive" instructions to refer to the
type of instructions given to the jury. See, e.g., Prenkert, supra note 48, at 536
n.128.
62. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45.
63. Brod, supra note 42, at 354.
64. Id. (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
65. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 276 ("The plurality thus effectively reads the causation
requirement out of [Title VII], and then replaces it with an 'affirmative
defense.'").
67. Id. at 276-77; see also Ostrand, supra note 30, at 413 n.95 (explaining
that "Justice O'Connor did not define 'direct evidence,' but she provided
examples of what did not constitute direct evidence," including "'stray remarks
in the workplace,' 'statements by nondecisionmakers [sic], or statements by
decisionmakers [sic] unrelated to the decisional process'").
68. Brod, supra note 42, at 354 (quoting Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539
U.S. 90, 98 (2003), which states that the Supreme Court will not address which
Price Waterhouse opinion is controlling).
69. See Ostrand, supra note 30, at 416; see also supra notes 42-46 and
1034 [Vol:51
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Waterhouse's "motivating factor" mixed-motive framework,o
Congress overruled the Supreme Court's affirmative defense
provision, allowing the employer to escape liability if it could
prove it would have made the same decision even if it had not
considered the protected trait.7 ' The 1991 Act made it
unlawful for an employer to have any discriminatory
motive.72 Even though Congress used the Price Waterhouse
plurality's "motivating factor" language in the 1991 Act,
subsequent courts have continued to utilize Justice
O'Connor's "direct evidence" requirement in Title VII
discrimination cases.
2. Direct Evidence Requirement Eliminated?
In 2003, the Supreme Court unanimously eliminated
Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement for Title VII
claims in Desert Palace v. Costa .7 The Court determined
that the 1991 Act did not explicitly mention any requirement
of a heightened showing of discrimination through direct
evidence. 5 Moreover, the Court refused to interpret Title VII
as requiring a showing of direct evidence because Congress
explicitly defined "demonstrates" as used in the 1991 Act.
Under the 1991 Act, a plaintiff need only "demonstrate" the
employer considered an impermissible factor when making its
employment decision, a showing that does not require direct
evidence. The Court declined to depart from the
"conventional rule of civil litigation" that requires a plaintiff
to prove his or her claim through direct or circumstantial
accompanying text.
70. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006); see also Ostrand, supra note 30, at 416
n.109 (explaining that Title VII's section 107 language adopted the Price
Waterhouse plurality's "motivating factor" analysis).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); see also Brod, supra note 42, at 355 (stating
that the employee is not entitled to "damages, reinstatement, hiring or
promotion" if the employer would have made the same decision); see also
Ostrand, supra note 30, at 450-51 (explaining that by providing only limited
remedies, Title VII's goal to eradicate workplace discrimination is met without
overburdening employers who would have made the same adverse employment
decision).
73. Ostrand, supra note 30, at 418.
74. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003).
75. Id. at 98-99.
76. Id. at 99 (indicating that Congress's failure to specify a heightened
showing is significant because other provisions of Title 42 explicitly impose
heightened standards).
1035
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evidence." Thus, Desert Palace does not require a plaintiff to
present direct evidence to obtain a Title VII mixed-motive
jury instruction.'
Following Desert Palace, there were clear instructions
from the Court on Title VII cases; however, the federal
circuits were split with respect to the type of evidence
required in non-Title VII mixed-motive cases. 9 Because the
Supreme Court relied on the 1991 Act's amendment of Title
VII when it decided Desert Palace, it remained unclear going
forward whether it was binding precedent in ADEA mixed-
motive cases as a result of Congress's silence with respect to
the 1991 Act's applicability to claims brought under the
ADEA.so The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and District of
Columbia Circuits have followed Desert Palace's holding, and
do not require an ADEA plaintiff to make a showing of direct
evidence."' Conversely, the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have continued to follow Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, and have
required an ADEA plaintiff to show direct evidence to obtain
a mixed-motive instruction.8 2 Thus, the Supreme Court's
silence with respect to whether Desert Palace applied to
ADEA mixed-motive claims has left the lower courts with
little guidance as to the appropriate proof structure." Before
addressing the Supreme Court's decision in Gross, it is
important to examine how the Court previously decided
claims brought under the ADEA.
77. See id. at 99-100 (noting that direct evidence is often difficult for a
plaintiff to obtain where the employer's mental processes must be revealed).
78. Id. at 101.
79. Brod, supra note 42, at 357 (commenting on the split that emerged with
respect to the type of evidence required in non-Title VII mixed-motives cases).
80. See id. at 356-57 (observing that Congress did not extend the 1991 Act
to the Americans with Disabilities Act, ADEA, and Title VII retaliation claims).
81. Id. at 357 n.63 (listing Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and District of
Columbia Circuit decisions that allowed the plaintiff to present circumstantial
or direct evidence).
82. Id. at 357 n.64 (listing First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuit decisions noting Price Waterhouse as binding precedent requiring direct
evidence).
83. William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L.
REV. 81, 98 (2009) (stating that the Supreme Court in Desert Palace explicitly
declined to consider whether the 1991 Act applied outside of the mixed-motive
context).
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3. ADEA Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court first suggested that claims brought
under the ADEA were evaluated differently from claims
brought under Title VII in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.'
There, a sixty-two-year-old employee was fired a few weeks
before his pension vested, and he subsequently brought a
claim under the ADEA against his former employer. The
Court began the opinion by analyzing the ADEA's purpose-
to eradicate age discrimination in the workplace where "[t]he
employer cannot rely on age as a proxy for an employee's
remaining characteristics, such as productivity, but must
instead focus on those factors directly."" The Court went on
to recognize that if age is not the determinative factor in the
employer's decision, no issue of ageist stereotyping exists.
Thus, "a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the
employee's protected trait actually played a role in [the
decision making] process and had a determinative influence
on the outcome.""
The Court cautioned against assuming age
discrimination merely based upon a company's decision to fire
an older employee nearing a vested pension." Disparate
treatment does not occur if the employer considers other
factors besides age, even if the age factor might be related."
Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's
84. See Green, supra note 28, at 423 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604 (1993)); see also Burke, supra note 23, at 53 (stating that the Supreme
Court in Hazen Paper indicated in dicta that the burden shifting analysis in the
1991 Act was inapplicable).
85. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 607 (1993).
86. Id. at 611 (explaining how the ADEA was prompted by Congress's
concern that older workers were being deprived of employment opportunities
based upon inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes).
87. Id. ("The prohibited stereotype . . . would not have figured in [the
employer's] decision, and the attendant stigma would not ensue.").
88. Id. at 610; see also Ostrand, supra note 30, at 420 (stating the "played a
role/determinative influence" standard is cited in subsequent ADEA cases).
89. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 612. ("Because age and years of service are
analytically distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the
other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of service is
necessarily 'age based.'").
90. See Burke, supra note 23, at 53-54 (explaining that an ADEA violation
does not automatically occur merely because age and number of years of service
are correlated). But see Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 616 (stressing that an ADEA
violation could be found if facts indicate the employer knows or recklessly
disregards ADEA provisions).
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judgment, and remanded the case to ensure that the lower
court did not improperly link the employee's age with the
time of the pension vesting." More importantly, Hazen Paper
differentiated ADEA claims from Title VII claims by
indicating that disparate impact claims, where the plaintiff
can only claim and demonstrate a discriminatory result as
opposed to demonstrating discriminatory intent, are not
available under the ADEA."
In 2005, the Supreme Court, in Smith v. City of Jackson,
declared that because the provisions and purposes of the
ADEA parallel Title VII, both should be interpreted
similarly." In Smith, a group of police and public safety
officers alleged that salary increases received in 1999 violated
the ADEA because the increase was "less generous to officers
over the age of [forty] than to younger officers."94 The Court
held that disparate impact claims were not available under
the ADEA and thereby narrowed the scope of protection
provided by the ADEA in comparison with Title VII, because
of textual differences between the statutes.9 5  Namely, the
ADEA's disparate impact scope is narrower because its RFOA
provision allows the employer to consider "reasonable factors
other than age" in its decision making process. 96
Furthermore, the Court determined that the employer's use
of any non-age factor in its employment practice decisions is
placed under a reasonableness standard, despite the
availability of other, heightened standards.9 7  Thus, the
91. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 616-17.
92. Green, supra note 28, at 426 (explaining that even though Title VII and
the ADEA share similar histories and purposes, they are different due to the
ADEA's protected class). "Disparate impact [discrimination] occurs when a
facially neutral employment practice adversely impacts one group more harshly
than another and cannot be justified by a business need. Unlike disparate
treatment, a plaintiff need not prove any discriminatory motive when she
alleges disparate impact." Id. at 421.
93. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
94. Id. at 230.
95. Id. at 240 ("Two textual differences between the ADEA and Title VII
make it clear that even though both statutes authorize recovery on a disparate-
impact theory, the scope of disparate-impact liability under ADEA is narrower
than under Title VII.").
96. Id.
97. Id. at 243 ("[The method] selected [by the defendant] was not
unreasonable. Unlike [Title VII's] business necessity test, which asks whether
there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in
disparate impact on a protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no
1038 [Vol:51
2011] ANOTHER MOVE AWAY FROM TITLE VII
disparate impact analysis in ADEA claims is narrower than
in Title VII claims because of the ADEA's RFOA provision
and the reasonableness standard applied to the employer's
practice under the ADEA."
The Supreme Court's decisions in Hazen Paper and
Smith left no clear evidentiary standard for ADEA disparate
impact claims." Likewise, the circuit court split that arose
after Desert Palace left the evidentiary standard for ADEA
disparate treatment claims undecided.100 The appropriate
legal framework for the ADEA was in desperate need of
clarification.
C. Mixed-Motive Instructions Obliterated in ADEA Cases:
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
In 2008,101 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gross
v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. to address the circuit court
split that had ensued following the decision in Desert
Palace.10 2 The issue presented to the Court was whether a
plaintiff needed to present direct evidence of discrimination to
obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title VII
discrimination case. o0
1. Factual Background and the Lower Court Decisions
Jack Gross worked for FBL Financial Services, Inc.
("FBL") for seven years before voluntarily leaving the
company.'04 After being rehired in 1987, FBL promoted
Gross numerous times before he reached the position of
Claims Administration Director in 2001.105 In 2003, when
Gross was fifty-four years old, FBL reassigned Gross to the
Claims Project Coordinator position and ultimately replaced
such requirement.").
98. See Burke, supra note 23, at 58-59.
99. See Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate
Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POLY REV. 95, 115
(2006) ("The Smith decision marks a new height of uncertainty and confusion in
disparate impact law, as well as its erosion to near nonexistence.").
100. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
101. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008).
102. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also Ostrand, supra note 30, at 424 (citing the district court
opinion).
105. Ostrand, supra note 30, at 424 (citing the district court opinion).
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him with a forty-year-old female co-worker.' 0 6 Gross believed
FBL demoted him "because of his age," and he sued FBL,
alleging a violation of the ADEA.'r
The district court judge gave the jury a mixed-motive
instruction, the jury returned a verdict in Gross's favor, and it
awarded him lost compensation. 0 8  FBL appealed the
decision and challenged the jury instructions, arguing that
Gross did not present the requisite direct evidence for the
mixed-motive instruction.10 The Eighth Circuit reversed and
remanded, holding that the jury had been improperly
instructed. "o The appellate court conceded that Desert
Palace abrogated the direct evidence requirement in Title VII
cases, but concluded that it did not apply to ADEA cases."'
Gross filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve
whether a plaintiff needed to present direct evidence to obtain
this mixed-motive instruction.112
2. Majority Holding and its Rationale
The Supreme Court ultimately did not determine the
direct evidence issue on appeal. 113  Instead, the Court first
examined whether the burden of proof ever shifted to the
defendant in a mixed-motive claim under the ADEA.114 The
Court explained that "[t]his Court has never held that [the
mixed-motive] burden-shifting framework applies to ADEA
claims . . . . Unlike Title VII, the ADEA's text does not
provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by
showing that age was simply a motivating factor.""s Thus,
106. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346-47 (explaining how Mr. Gross previously
supervised the female co-worker who ultimately replaced him).
107. Id. at 2347 (stating that Gross presented evidence at trial to suggest
that age was at least a factor in FBL's decision making process, while FBL
contended that Gross's reassignment was due to corporate restructuring).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2348 (stating that the district court incorrectly used Justice
O'Connor's "direct evidence" standard in Price Waterhouse despite the Circuit
precedent).
111. Ostrand, supra note 30, at 425 n.170 (citing the appellate court decision
that cited Price Waterhouse as controlling precedent).
112. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2349 ("When conducting statutory interpretation, we 'must be
careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute
without careful and critical examination.'").
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the Court concluded that a mixed-motive "jury instruction is
never proper in an ADEA case."" 6
The Court's analysis focused primarily on statutory
construction and interpretation."' The Court observed that
Title VII is "materially different with respect to the relevant
burden of persuasion.""' The majority opinion declined to
follow' precedent in Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace
because of the textual differences between Title VII and the
ADEA.' 9 The statutory text of Title VII diverges from the
ADEA because Title VII specifically authorizes discrimination
claims where the protected trait was a "motivating factor" in
the employment decision. 120 Additionally, the Court
interpreted Congress's decision not to explicitly extend the
1991 Act amendment to the ADEA as an intentional act.121
Thus, the Court decided that the burden-shifting framework
was inappropriate for use in ADEA cases, and accordingly, it
did not apply the Price Waterhouse or Desert Palace
precedents in its ADEA analysis.122
3. Justice Stevens's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the
Court had "engage[d] in unnecessary lawmaking" by
considering issues not on appeal. 2 3  Justice Stevens
contended that the "most natural reading" of the ADEA's
"because of' language prohibits adverse employment
decisions motivated wholly or partially by the employee's
116. Id. at 2346.
117. See, e.g., id. at 2349 (describing Congress's decision to amend only Title
VII and not the ADEA); see also id. at 2350 (focusing on the ADEA's "because
of" textual language and interpreting the term according to Webster's
Dictionary).
118. Id. at 2348.
119. See id. at 2349.
120. Id.
121. Id. ("We cannot ignore Congress's decision to amend Title VII's relevant
provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA . . . . '[Negative
implications raised by disparate [impact] provisions are strongest' when the
provisions were 'considered simultaneously when the language raising the
implication was inserted.'").
122. Id. at 2351-52 (arguing that the burden-shifting analysis in Price
Waterhouse is difficult for lower courts to apply and that any benefit that might
be achieved by extending it to the ADEA is outweighed by the burdens).
123. Id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Court did not
grant certiorari to decide if a mixed-motive instruction is ever appropriate in an
ADEA case).
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age. 12 4 Specifically, Justice Stevens maintained that because
the relevant language in both statutes is identical, the
majority should not have departed from the preceding
interpretation of the "because of" language from the Price
Waterhouse case.12 5 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that a
plaintiff should not be required to present direct evidence to
receive a mixed-motives instruction for claims brought under
the ADEA.1 26
D. Proposed Legislation: Protecting Older Workers Against
Discrimination Act
In response to Gross's elimination of the availability of
mixed-motive jury instructions for ADEA plaintiffs, Congress
introduced a bill to overturn the decision-the Protecting
Older Workers Against Discrimination Act ("POWADA").'2 7
POWADA asserts that because the ADEA contains language
that is identical to Title VII, Congress intended the statutes,
including the 1991 Act, to be interpreted consistently.'2 8 The
proposed legislation contends that Gross narrowed the
ADEA's scope of protection, consequently eliminating the
protection Congress intended to provide.12 9 If Congress fails
to take action, then "victims of age discrimination will find it
unduly difficult to prove their claims and victims of other
types of discrimination may find their rights and remedies
uncertain and unpredictable." 30
POWADA combats the Gross decision by adding a
subsection to the ADEA that creates a finding of liability if an
impermissible factor, such as age, was a "motivating factor"
124. Id. at 2353-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen 'an employer considers
both [the protected trait] and legitimate factors at the time of making a
decision, that decision was 'because of [the protected trait].'").
125. Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Wie have long recognized that our
interpretations of Title VII's language apply 'with equal force in the context of
age discrimination, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA were derived in
haec verba from Title VII.'").
126. Id. at 2357 (following Desert Palace's holding and declining to follow
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse).
127. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 1756, 111th
Cong. (2009).
128. See § 2(a)(3) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Gross ... has eroded this
long-held understanding of consistent interpretation and circumvented well-
established precedents.").
129. § 2(a)(4).
130. § 2(a)(6).
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in an employment practice decision.'a' Like Title VII,
POWADA limits a plaintiffs remedies if the defendant can
show it would have taken the same adverse action without
considering an impermissible factor.13 2 If a defendant can
make out this "same-action" requisite showing, a court may
only grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys'
fees to the plaintiff.'3 3  If the defendant makes the "same-
action" showing, a court "shall not award damages or issue an
order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring,
promotion, or payment."134
Thus, using POWADA, Congress intends "to ensure that
the standard of proving unlawful disparate treatment under
the [ADEA] and other anti-discrimination . . . laws is no
different than the standard for making such a proof under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including
amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991."113" But
Congress tempers this intention by providing only limited
remedies for a plaintiff if the defendant can prove that it
would have taken the same adverse action, regardless of its
use of an impermissible factor. 36
POWADA did not become law.'3  The bill was referred to
the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and
Pensions where hearings were held, but the bill did not
progress any further before the close of the 111th
Congressional session.13 8  The bill may or may not be
reintroduced in the next Congressional session.
III. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR PROVING
UNLAWFUL AGE DISCRIMINATION?
The holding in Gross shocked the employment law
community because of its complete elimination of the mixed-
motive instruction that had been commonly used for ADEA
cases. 3 9 Some scholars suggest that Congress should amend
131. § 3 (proposing to extend the 1991 Act remedies to the ADEA).
132. See generally § 3(g)(1)(A).
133. § 3(g)(2)(A).
134. § 3(g)(2)(B).
135. § 2(b).
136. § 3.
137. See supra note 18.
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., Ostrand, supra note 30, at 438-39 (citing sources indicating
that businesses applauded Gross, and that the decision may have impacted
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the ADEA to broaden the scope of the ADEA's protection of
older workers, in a similar manner to POWADA.'4 0 However,
while passage of the proposed legislation seems to be the next
logical move to broaden the protection for older workers,141 it
is important to explore the positive effects that resulted from
the Gross decision when it held "but for" causation to be the
appropriate standard in ADEA cases. By considering the
benefits of Gross as well as the pitfalls, lawyers, scholars, and
lawmakers can be wholly informed, and better able to
determine whether Gross's "but for" causation or the post-
1991 Title VII mixed-motive instruction is a better outcome
for ADEA litigation.
IV. RECONCILING GROSS AND PROPER ADEA CAUSAL
FRAMEWORK
A. The Differences Between the ADEA and Title VII
Overcome the Statutes' Similarities
Title VII and the ADEA were both enacted to eradicate
discrimination in the workplace.' 4 2 Similarly, because the
ADEA and Title VII use identical language, courts have
traditionally relied on precedent developed in Title VII cases
for guidance on how to properly analyze claims arising under
the ADEA.14 3  Nevertheless, there are some significant
distinctions between the statutes that should not be
overlooked.
1. The ADEA and Title VII Should Be Interpreted
Differently Because of Their Distinct Protected Classes
The differences between the ADEA and Title VII's
policies, congressional purposes, and substantive statutory
provisions outweigh the fact that both statutes use nearly
whether plaintiffs can file suits under the ADEA at all).
140. See, e.g., Tracey, supra note 56, at 661 (arguing Congress should amend
the ADEA to permit mixed-motive instructions); see also Corbett, supra note 83,
at 108-09 (contending that Congress should adopt the mixed-motive structure
for all discrimination cases); see also Ostrand, supra note 30, at 446 (claiming
that Congress should amend the ADEA to be consistent with Title VII).
141. See Corbett, supra note 83, at 109; see also Tracey, supra note 56, at
659-60 (arguing that Gross makes it difficult for plaintiffs to claim ADEA
violations except in blatant cases).
142. Green, supra note 28, at 418.
143. Id.
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identical language. The different policy considerations stem
from the way in which the protected classes are defined.'4
Age is not an "immutable characteristic," but it is a
characteristic that changes naturally and eventually as a
person grows older.145 Basically, "age discrimination differs
from discrimination based upon race or sex, because age, the
defining class factor, is a continuum."146
Courts have treated age and other forms of
discrimination in completely different ways, based upon the
mutability of age and the proper standard of review for age
classifications.147  But some scholars and courts argue that
the statutes should be treated similarly because both were
intended to combat employment discrimination as a whole.14
The Court in Smith v. City of Jackson, however, recognized
that disparate impact claims under the ADEA should be
interpreted more narrowly than Title VII claims because age
is often relevant to one's ability to perform specific types of
work, unlike Title VII's protected traits.'4 9
2. Policy Differences Dictate Separate Interpretations
The ADEA and Title VII were enacted to address
different concerns. In Hazen Paper, the Court distinguished
age discrimination from other forms of discrimination because
it was not founded upon general feelings of hostility but
rather inaccurate misconceptions with respect to an
individual's capabilities."5 o Accordingly, because Title VII's
protected characteristics lack any relation to ability, Title
VII's broad scope-protecting workers from the most subtle
and subconscious forms of discrimination-is justified.' 1 One
144. Id. at 425.
145. Id. ("Inevitably, it is this factor that will cause every employee, if he or
she lives long enough, to become an economic liability to his or her employer.").
146. Id. (distinguishing Title VII's distinct and concrete characteristics as
readily identifiable).
147. See Bitter, supra note 26, at 659-60 (reasoning that older persons have
not experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or other
stereotypical negatives untrue of their abilities). Also, the Supreme Court has
held that rational basis is the appropriate standard of scrutiny for age
classifications. Id.
148. Id. at 660 (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S.
352, 357 (1995) and Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)).
149. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 236-37 (2005).
150. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993).
151. See Bitter, supra note 26, at 676 (analyzing the differences between age
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cannot make the same argument for age discrimination,
however, because at some point, age is inherently related to
the ability to perform particular tasks."2
3. The Statutes' Unique Substantive Provisions Justify
Individual Analyses
Certain statutory provisions in both the ADEA and Title
VII further distinguish the two statutes, and indicate that
they should not be interpreted similarly. Most notably, when
Congress failed to extend the 1991 Act to the ADEA, it did so
with full awareness that ADEA claims were commonly
litigated under the same framework as Title VII claims.'
But some commentators argue that Congress's silence
regarding the applicability of the 1991 Act to ADEA claims
meant Congress intended the courts to resolve the issue.154
This argument overlooks the ADEA's two substantive
exceptions that allow employers to consider age in
employment decisions.15  Title VII has no similar exceptions
that permit employers to consider its protected traits in any
situation. 151
Another substantial difference between the ADEA and
Title VII is visible upon application of the ADEA's RFOA
provision.'5  Under this provision, employers do not violate
the ADEA if the employment decision was "based on
reasonable factors other than age."'58 Conversely, employers
can escape liability under Title VII if they can prove a
"business necessity." 59  Because something that is
"reasonable" is not always "necessary" for business
discrimination and other forms of discrimination with respect to disparate
impact liability).
152. Id. ("In addition, disparate impact theory seeks to redress the
cumulative effects of past discrimination. However, there is not an extensive
history of discrimination against older persons, and thus the disparate impact
model cannot be automatically applied to the ADEA.").
153. Id. at 674 ("[Congress] obviously knew that courts consistently
interpreted the ADEA and Title VII in haec verba, and therefore, Congress
arguably drafted the amendment to pertain only to Title VII.").
154. See id. at 675 (citing Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a
Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1184 (1993)).
155. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006).
158. See id.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
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operations, employers are given more leeway in terms of
making employment decisions under the ADEA than under
Title VII.16 0 The Supreme Court recognized that the scope of
the disparate impact liability under the ADEA is narrower
than under Title VII because the employer need only prove
the non-age factor was reasonable. 16 1  Unlike in Title VII
cases, the employer does not have to meet the higher
standard and show that the employment practice decision
was a "business necessity." 162
B. Mixed-Motive Instructions Are Not So Instructive After All
The Court's ruling in Gross effectively eliminated the
availability of mixed-motive instructions for ADEA cases.16 3
This doctrinal step away from Title VII allows for more
clarity and consistency as to the appropriate causal
framework for ADEA cases, and it resolved the circuit split
with respect to the direct or circumstantial evidence
requirement. 164
1. The ADEA Does Not Incorporate a Clear Mixed-
Motive Standard
The "consistency presumption" of the ADEA's "because
of' language often dictated how courts applied the McDonnell
Douglas and Price Waterhouse burden-shifting frameworks to
ADEA cases.16 5  Still, it remains unclear whether mixed-
motive instructions can easily incorporate the distinct aspects
of the ADEA in the first place. 6 6
160. Prenkert, supra note 49, at 246 (explaining that the employer must
prove Title VII's "business necessity" defense while the ADEA's RFOA provision
provides a safe harbor).
161. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239 (2005) ("[I1n cases involving
disparate-impact claims that the RFOA provision plays its principal role by
precluding liability if the adverse impact was attributable to a nonage factor
that was 'reasonable.'").
162. See id.
163. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2009).
164. See Prenkert, supra note 48, at 562 ("The distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence serves no good purpose and only confuses the courts.").
165. See generally id. at 542-47 (explaining that courts took a restrictive
view of the 1991 Act and continued to preserve Justice O'Connor's Price
Waterhouse direct evidence requirement).
166. Id. at 548-49 (stating that courts have struggled distinguishing the
McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse frameworks and also with
incorporating the ADEA's RFOA provision).
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The causal standard language used in the burden-
shifting framework of mixed-motive jury instructions is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's causal standard of
proof language as set out in Hazen Paper.6 7  According to
Hazen Paper, the plaintiff must prove the protected trait
actually played a role in the employment decision and had a
determinative influence on the outcome.' 6 8 Conversely, Price
Waterhouse and the 1991 Act require that the plaintiff
demonstrate that a protected trait was a "motivating factor"
in the adverse employment decision. 69  Thus, the "played a
role/determinative influence" language in Hazen Paper
creates a higher standard than the "motivating factor"
language in Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act.170
Even though most courts that have adjudicated ADEA
claims have applied some form of mixed-motive analysis, the
application of the specific type of burden shifting framework
has not been uniform. '7' Because Congress failed to explicitly
extend the 1991 Act to the ADEA, courts continued to
interpret the ADEA in conformity with the pre-1991 Price
Waterhouse framework.' 72 Thus, the resulting "mixed-motive
mess"7 3  has left courts without a clear standard for
adjudicating ADEA claims. 7 4
2. A "Motivating Factor" Should Not Matter
Another impractical feature of the availability of mixed-
motive jury instructions, is the caveat that this framework
still punishes an employer if the protected trait was a
167. Id. at 549; see also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
168. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) ("Whatever the
employer's decisionmaking [sic] process, a disparate treatment claim cannot
succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in that
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.").
169. See supra notes 59-62, 69-73 and accompanying text.
170. Prenkert, supra note 48, at 549.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 550 (citing Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir.
2004)).
173. Professor Prenkert refers to the inconsistent application of the mixed-
motives framework in disparate treatment law claims outside of Title VII as the
"mixed-motives mess." Id. at 547.
174. See id. at 547 ("The 1991 Act's motivating-factor/same-decision
framework cannot be the uniform, unifying force that it might be, because the
courts continue to adhere to the fragmented pre-1991 setup outside the Title VII
context.").
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"motivating factor" in its decision making process. 1 5 Before
the 1991 Act, an employer was not liable under Title VII if it
could prove it would have fired the employee regardless of the
protected trait.7 6  However, Congress's amendment to Title
VII allows for limited remedies if the protected characteristic
was a "motivating factor" in order to achieve Title VII's goal
of eradicating all "invidious consideration" of race, color,
national origin, sex, or religion."' Even if the above reason
rightfully justifies the "motivating factor" caveat, the same
reason cannot easily be extended to the ADEA because Title
VII and the ADEA's purposes are not identical.178
Furthermore, if the employer could prove it would have
made the same employment decision regardless of the
illegitimate reason, one must wonder why it should matter
whether the employer even considered the illegitimate
reason.179  One often overlooked concern is the impact that
expanding ADEA protection would have on the competitive
employment m'arket, specifically that the presence of older
employees in the workplace could prove detrimental to the
employment market. 80
Moreover, the ADEA's RFOA provision, as compared to
Title VII's higher "business necessity" standard, exemplifies
that disparate impact claims are meant to be narrower under
the ADEA than Title VII.181 If the employer can prove its
decision was based upon a "reasonable factor other than age,"
175. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
176. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 282 (1989).
177. See supra note 44-46 and accompanying text.
178. See Bitter, supra note 26, at 674-75 (describing the ADEA's legislative
history, focusing on the fundamental differences between age discrimination
and other forms of discrimination); see also Green, supra note 28, at 414-16
(noting that a purpose of the ADEA is to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination);
supra Part IV.A.2.
179. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 282 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Our
decisions confirm that Title VII is not concerned with the mere presence of
impermissible motives; it is directed to employment decisions that result from
those motives.").
180. Tracey, supra note 56, at 658 (noting that broadening the ADEA's scope
would unfairly prolong the presence of older workers in the workplace); see also
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 ("The other important aspect of [Title VII] is
its preservation of an employer's remaining freedom of choice.").
181. See Corbett, supra note 83, at 99 (claiming that Congress wrongly
presumed that these terms obtained adequate pre-Wards Cove definitions); see
also Prenkert, supra note 49, at 232 (stating that the new terms replaced the
more lenient standard laid out on Wards Cove).
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even if age was a "motivating factor," the employer has
technically still not violated the ADEA.'18 Thus, unless
Congress agrees that ADEA cases should be easier to win
than Title VII cases, any "motivating factor" language should
be inapplicable to claims brought under the ADEA. 3
C. Gross's "But for" Causation is Workable, While the Mixed-
Motive Standard Remains Difficult for Courts to Apply
The Supreme Court's ruling in Gross, which selected a
single causal framework from among the conflicting ADEA
precedents, depended largely upon statutory
interpretation.'8 4 Yet, the Court mentioned in dicta that "it
has become evident in the years since [Price Waterhouse] was
decided that its burden-shifting framework is difficult to
apply . . . . [I1n cases tried to a jury, courts have found it
particularly difficult to craft an instruction to explain its
burden-shifting framework.""ss Mixed-motive cases allow
plaintiffs to escape the burden of proving a discriminatory
motive and instead place that burden on the defendant to
prove the discrimination had no impact on its decision
making process.186 Once the burden shifts to the employer, it
has the difficult challenge of proving a negative, and
defending a decision by demonstrating that it was not the
result of age discrimination."' Thus, the shifting standard of
proof inherent in mixed-motive analyses presents practical
problems for courts.188
Conversely, under the "but for" causal standard, the
plaintiff retains the burden of proof at all times to show that
182. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 253 (2005).
183. See Corbett, supra note 83, at 112 (arguing Title VII and ADEA
disparate impact claims should be interpreted similarly for simplicity and
"nondiscrimination").
184. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348-51 (2009).
185. Id. at 2352.
186. Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the
Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17,
106 (1991) ("Mixed motives analysis is generally used by courts as an evasion
device in factually difficult discrimination cases, as a method of simplifying
these cases.").
187. Gregg M. Lemley, U.S. Supreme Court Issues Employer-Friendly ADEA
Ruling, LEXISNEXIS MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LEGAL ARTICLES (Aug. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.martindale.com/labor-employment-law/articleOgletree-
Deakins-Nash-Smoak-Stewart-PC_782758.htm.
188. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
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his or her age was the "but for" cause of the adverse
employment action. 8 9 The burden of persuasion never shifts
to the defendant.190 This alleged "lower standard" for
defendants in ADEA cases coincides with Congress's
recognition that age and Title VII's protected classes should
not be afforded the same scope of protection.191 Even though
the "but for" causal framework is a seemingly higher bar for
ADEA plaintiffs than the mixed-motive "motivating factor"
requirement, it provides a clearer, bright line test that does
not interfere with the ADEA's remedial purpose.' 92
D. Extending Mixed-Motive Instructions to the ADEA is Not
Doctrinally Sound and Will Not Ease Confusion in the Courts
Many commentators have urged Congress to repudiate
Gross and pass legislation to extend the 1991 Act to the
ADEA.193 These scholars argue that Congress is attempting
to prohibit all forms of discrimination in the workplace and
that the decision in Gross undermines the ADEA's deterrent
purpose.194 Moreover, they argue that it will be more difficult
for ADEA plaintiffs to prove their case with Gross's higher
"but for" standard since the defendant employer typically has
most of the evidence.' Another criticism of the Gross
decision is that juries will be faced with the challenge of
separating out two sets of instructions if a plaintiff claims
violations of both Title VII and the ADEA.' 96
189. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
190. See Ostrand, supra note 30, at 439 (stating that now employers only
need to show that other factors affected their decision).
191. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
192. See generally Gudel, supra note 186, at 107 (commenting that although
the "but for" causation is difficult to establish, it does not interfere with Title
VII's remedial purpose).
193. See, e.g., Ostrand, supra note 30, at 446; see also Corbett, supra note 83,
at 108-09.
194. See, e.g., Ostrand, supra note 30, at 447 ("Although age discrimination is
not necessarily invidious, it is discrimination nonetheless and should be
eradicated from the workplace.").
195. Id. at 440; see also Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
857, 882-83 (2010) (mentioning that many plaintiffs do not get past summary
judgment motions).
196. Ostrand, supra note 30, at 440 (presenting two standards to a jury will
"amplifly] the difficulty" instead of easing it (quoting Darrell VanDeusen,
Darrell VanDeusen on New Standards in Age Discrimination Litigation:
Gross v. FBL Fin. Services, Inc., 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 4021
(Jul. 15, 2009), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/estate-
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Yet the flaw in most of these criticisms is that the
purpose of the ADEA is not to eradicate all forms of age
discrimination in the workplace, but only arbitrary age
discrimination. '9 Because Title VII's remedial purpose is to
eradicate all forms of subtle discrimination based on Title
VII's protected classes, even considering the protected trait
constitutes a violation of the statute. 98  Nonetheless, the
application of mixed-motive instructions to ADEA cases has
created an improper precedent, and it has confused the
purpose of the remedial statute.'99 When reductions in the
workforce are necessary during recessions, it is important to
allow employers to make legitimate, non-discriminatory
decisions based upon criteria that are naturally correlated to
age. 200  Therefore, Gross's repudiation of the mixed-motive
instruction to ADEA cases finally affords the ADEA its
unique and separate standard from Title VII, corresponding
with its purpose and allowing courts to discern the
appropriate precedent for ADEA cases.2 0 '
V. GRoss GOT IT RIGHT
This comment proposes that expanding the ADEA's
protection by passing the Protecting Older Workers Against
Discrimination Act, or any other similar Act in the future,
does not comport with the ADEA's intended purpose and
scope. Instead, Congress should clarify that Gross's "but for"
causation standard applies only to ADEA cases, and that it
has no effect on Title VII legislation. By limiting "but for"
causation to the ADEA, there would be no confusion as to the
appropriate precedent for either a claim brought under Title
VII or the ADEA, and Congress would further differentiate
the two statutes. Moreover, Congress would be formally
acknowledging the substantial distinctions between Title VII
elderlaw/blogs/estatepraxticeandelderlawcommentaryarchive/2009/07/2lVanD
eusen-on-New-Standards-in-Age-Discrimination-Litigation_3A00_-Gross-v.-
FBL-Fin.-Services_2C00_-Inc_2E00_.aspx).
197. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
199. See Prenkert, supra note 48, at 560-62.
200. See Lemley, supra note 187.
201. See Bitter, supra note 26, at 679-81 ("[Tihe legislative findings would
assert that ... by allowing for an employer to be held liable even if a non-age
factor motivates its employment practice, [it has] undermined Congress's
original intent in passing the ADEA.").
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and the ADEA through the separate causal standards.
Congress should not extend the 1991 Act to the ADEA
because doing so would improperly expand the ADEA's
protection to include all forms of age discrimination and thus
would invalidate the ADEA's original RFOA provision. Even
if the "but for" causal standard makes it harder for ADEA
plaintiffs to prove age discrimination, the courts will be
properly adjudicating the claims in accordance with the
statute's true purpose and congressional intent. Confusion in
the courts will decrease and varying statutory interpretations
will no longer yield conflicting judicial outcomes.
If Congress revives the POWADA in the future, it should
be rewritten to codify the "but-for" standard of causation for
ADEA cases and to allow for plaintiffs to recover damages.
That way, employers will be deterred from committing
arbitrary age discrimination, but will be allowed to make
legitimate, non-discriminatory decisions based upon factors
that are naturally correlated to age.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress should not codify the mixed motive standard of
proof for causation and extend the ADEA's protections. Even
though the ADEA and Title VII share similar roots and
statutory language, their fundamental purposes, substantive
provisions, and underlying congressional intentions remain
distinct. By formally recognizing the differences between
Title VII and the ADEA, Congress will finally set the correct
tone for interpreting the ADEA and will thereby make
precedent clearer and easier for the courts to follow. This
clarification will in turn help streamline ADEA cases and
alleviate confusion regarding the proper standard of proof for
causation.
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